Modelling in infectious diseases: between haphazard and hazard  by Neuberger, A. et al.
Modelling in infectious diseases: between haphazard and hazard
A. Neuberger1,2, M. Paul1,3, A. Nizar2 and D. Raoult4
1) Unit of Infectious Diseases, Rambam Health Care Campus, Haifa, 2) Department of Medicine B, Rambam Health Care Campus, Haifa, 3) Sackler Faculty
of Medicine, Tel-Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv, Israel and 4) Unite de Recherche en Maladies Infectieuses et Tropicales Emergentes, CNRS-IRD UMR 6236, Faculte
de Medecine, Universite de la Mediterranee, Marseille, France
Abstract
Modelling of infectious diseases is difﬁcult, if not impossible. No epidemic has ever been truly predicted, rather than being merely noticed
when it was already ongoing. Modelling the future course of an epidemic is similarly tenuous, as exempliﬁed by ominous predictions
during the last inﬂuenza pandemic leading to exaggerated national responses. The continuous evolution of microorganisms, the
introduction of new pathogens into the human population and the interactions of a speciﬁc pathogen with the environment, vectors,
intermediate hosts, reservoir animals and other microorganisms are far too complex to be predictable. Our environment is changing at
an unprecedented rate, and human-related factors, which are essential components of any epidemic prediction model, are difﬁcult to
foresee in our increasingly dynamic societies. Any epidemiological model is, by deﬁnition, an abstraction of the real world, and
fundamental assumptions and simpliﬁcations are therefore required. Indicator-based surveillance methods and, more recently, Internet
biosurveillance systems can detect and monitor outbreaks of infections more rapidly and accurately than ever before. As the interactions
between microorganisms, humans and the environment are too numerous and unexpected to be accurately represented in a
mathematical model, we argue that prediction and model-based management of epidemics in their early phase are quite unlikely to
become the norm.
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Introduction
Prophecy is a good line of business, but it is full of risks.
Mark Twain in Following the Equator
Epidemics have played a role in human history since ancient
times, and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future,
despite overoptimistic assurances to the contrary. When the
Black Death pandemic was ravaging Europe during the Middle
Ages, the only sound advice given to the citizens was “ﬂee
early, ﬂee far, return late”. As reﬂected in the Introduction of
Boccaccio’s Decameron, the citizens of Florence “decided that
the only remedy for the pestilence was to avoid it … [that]
none ought to stay in a place thus doomed to destruction”.
Modern medicine does not have to resort to such extreme
measures of public health, and nor does it ascribe the
occurrence of epidemics to a certain alignment of the stars,
the will of God, harmful vapours, or the poisoning of wells by
non-believers. Surveillance systems make the early detection
of disease outbreaks possible through data supplied by sentinel
clinics, or by the use of syndromic surveillance (e.g. Web
queries, other forms of Internet biosurveillance, over-the-
counter drug sales, or school absence records) [1]. We would
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argue, however, that timely prediction of epidemics before
they occur, and accurate forecasts of their course in their early
phase, remain, by and large, unreliable.
Pathogen–pathogen Interactions and other
Unknowns
The Division of Tuberculosis Control shares the belief of the
symposium participants that tuberculosis will virtually disap-
pear in the United States in the next 50 years. The control and
eradication of tuberculosis, New England Journal of Medicine,
1980.
Since the early 1950s, tuberculosis (TB) rates in high--
income countries have decreased rapidly. In 1980, treatment
was available and effective, and it seemed reasonable to include
TB in the list of “disappearing and declining diseases” in Britain
[2]. The authors were naturally unaware of the fact that the
AIDS pandemic was already making hundreds of thousands of
people worldwide susceptible to a disease previously consid-
ered to be a remnant of the 19th century [3]. The surge in the
incidence of TB and the appearance of multidrug-resistant and
extensively drug-resistant TB in eastern Europe in recent
decades is causally linked to a wide variety of actors: the AIDS
pandemic, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the increase in
intravenous drug abuse there. Predicting the occurrence of
these epidemiological and political phenomena was not
possible in 1980. Beijing genotype strains of Mycobacterium
tuberculosis now account for approximately 50% of TB cases in
China, and are spreading worldwide [4]. This genotype has
been observed to spread more successfully in the population
than other M. tuberculosis strains. The reasons for this are
incompletely understood [4]. Will this genotype change the
epidemiology of TB? Will vaccination and treatment trigger the
appearance of other successful genotypes? Nearly 20 years
after the ﬁrst description of the M. tuberculosis Beijing geno-
type, and more than 30 years after the recurrence of the TB
pandemic, we still lack elementary biological and epidemiolog-
ical data to help with TB control.
The association between inﬂuenza virus infection and
subsequent susceptibility to Streptococcus pneumoniae infec-
tions was already well known nearly 100 years ago during the
Spanish inﬂuenza pandemic. However, the virus itself has the
capacity to mutate, and human society changes continuously,
so that predictions cannot be based on such historical
associations. If predictions were to rely on past observations,
one would expect adults aged ≥65 years, who are known to be
susceptible to both severe inﬂuenza and pneumococcal
infections, to have extremely high mortality rates during
inﬂuenza pandemics. Hygienic conditions today, however, are
different from those of 1919, pneumococcal sepsis being the
exception among patients with inﬂuenza. During the 2009 A/
H1N1 inﬂuenza virus pandemic, patients aged ≥65 years were
found to have death rates 81% lower than expected in a
regular inﬂuenza season [5]. In fact, obesity, not ageing, was
found to be a signiﬁcant risk factor for severe disease [5,6].
Not only was the inﬂuenza virus itself different, but it also
interacted with other viruses in important ways. In France, for
instance, a rhinovirus epidemic was found to delay the onset of
the inﬂuenza pandemic, which in itself delayed the onset of the
respiratory syncytial virus bronchiolitis season [6–8]. To
complicate things further, increasing evidence suggests that
some bacterial infections can also increase the susceptibility of
patients to viral infections [9].
Pathogen–environment Interactions
Not only the pathogens themselves, but also the complex
ecosystems, which include vectors and/or reservoir animals,
are crucial to understanding the dynamics of many infectious
diseases with an epidemic potential. The interaction between
the Anopheles mosquito vector, the Plasmodium falciparum
parasite and humans is a good example of such complexity. In
recent years, long-lasting insecticide-treated bed-nets have
been distributed in many sub-Saharan African countries,
following evidence from randomized controlled trials that
these reduce P. falciparum malaria prevalence, morbidity, and
mortality [10]. Although it was reasonable to assume that the
continuation of such efforts would lead to a gradual and
predictable decrease in malaria morbidity, the results of a
recent longitudinal study performed in Senegal highlight the
problematic nature of such simplistic forecasts. In this study,
the average incidence density of malaria attacks, which was
5.45 per 100 person-months before the distribution of treated
bed-nets, decreased to 0.41 immediately afterwards, only to
increase again to 4.57 per 100 person-months 27–20 months
after the initial intervention, despite continued use of the
bed-nets. The prevalence of knockdown resistance mutation,
which confers reduced sensitivity of the Anopheles vector to
pyrethroid insecticides, increased from 8% in 2007 to 48% in
2010. The mosquitoes were shown to become somewhat
more aggressive during the early evening, thereby avoiding the
need to ‘confront’ bed-nets [11]. Unpredictable events such as
these undermine the various attempts to model and predict
trends in malaria control and eradication [12,13].
There has been no cholera epidemic in the Caribbean island
of Hispaniola for more than a century, although cholera has
been present in Latin America since 1991. The Vibrio cholerae
strain that spread to all Haitian provinces after the 2010
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earthquake originated in Asia, and not from the neighbouring
countries in the Americas [14]. It has been suggested that the
bacteria were introduced into Haiti by United Nations soldiers
sent to Haiti after the earthquake. If this was indeed the case,
prediction of a cholera epidemic in Haiti in 2010 would also
have required, in addition to all other factors, an accurate
earthquake forecast.
The Ever-changing Variables
Contrariwise, continued Tweedledee, if it was so, it might be;
and if it were so, it would be; but as it isn’t, it ain’t. That’s logic.
Lewis Carroll in Through the Looking Glass
The list of factors that need to be included in an ‘ideal’ model
of epidemic prediction seems never-ending. We choose to
include certain variables in a model, but deliberately or
inadvertently ignore others.
Human-related variables include population density, nutri-
tional status, the number of susceptible hosts within the
population, infection control measures taken by individuals
within the population, healthcare infrastructure and available
resources, domestic and international travel, the use and
impact of quarantine, the use of (or refusal to use) antimicro-
bials and vaccines, and the public reaction to the epidemic (e.g.
population migration and closure of schools). Human African
trypanosomiasis (HAT), for example, was considered to be a
candidate for eradication in most African countries in the
1960s. The disease re-emerged later on, despite the availability
of effective, if somewhat toxic, treatment options. The reasons
for the increase in HAT incidence included factors such as
political instability in some African countries, such as the
Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African
Republic, failing healthcare systems, neglect of existing HAT
diagnosis and vector control programmes, lack of investment
in new drug development by pharmaceutical companies, and
the consideration of withdrawal of existing drugs on economic
grounds [15]. It is doubtful whether any of the above factors
could be reliably represented in a mathematical model.
Pathogen-related variables include, but are not limited to,
the duration of an incubation period, the period of pathogen
infectivity, the rate of disease transmission, the average age at
which a disease is typically contracted in a given population,
virulence, the susceptibility of the organism to antimicrobials,
and the availability of a vaccine. Most emerging infectious
diseases and nearly all pandemics were caused by ‘classic’
zoonotic pathogens (e.g. the plague), or by pathogens that
were initially conﬁned to animals or had limited potential for
causing human infections, but then mutated, crossed the
species barrier, and disseminated globally (e.g. SARS corona-
virus, and human immunodeﬁciency virus) [16]. A list contain-
ing animal pathogens that could potentially trigger a new
pandemic can be compiled; surveillance aimed at detecting an
outbreak of a disease caused by one of these pathogens should
hence be continuous. However, although making predictions
even about an organism as extensively researched as the
inﬂuenza virus seems to be difﬁcult, accurately predicting the
course of a pandemic caused by a pathogen newly introduced
into a human population is, in all likelihood, nearly impossible.
Finally, climate and environmental changes and their effects
on humans, intermediate hosts, reservoir animals and vectors
are all instrumental in the understanding of many infectious
diseases [17]. They are, however, still poorly understood,
immensely complex, and difﬁcult to predict with any accuracy
—as are, for instance, the changing seasonality of inﬂuenza
epidemics, the accelerated transmission of certain West Nile
virus genotypes with increasing temperatures, and the pre-
dicted extension northwards of freshwater snail-mediated
schistosomiasis in China [6,18,19]. Until several years ago,
malaria was considered to be in the pre-elimination phase in
Malaysia. The zoonotic Plasmodium knowlesi, a parasite that
mainly infects monkeys, has emerged as the dominant malaria
species in Malaysian Borneo, and is increasingly being reported
in other countries. Despite the fact that deforestation,
increased human activity at the forest fringes, rapid growth
in the population of Malaysian Borneo and closer contact
between humans and macaques were quite predictable, the
emergence of P. knowlesi as major human malaria parasite was
noted only in retrospect [20].
All of these factors are not only constantly changing, but are
also interacting with each other in an inﬁnite number of ways.
Thus, it is no wonder that no new epidemic has ever been truly
predicted, rather than being merely noticed when it was
already ongoing.
Models
As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not
certain; andas far as they arecertain, theydonot refer toreality.
Albert Einstein
The construction of a model aimed at predicting the course of
an epidemic necessitates assumptions and simpliﬁcations [21].
For example, it is common to assume a rectangular age
distribution, with most individuals in a population reaching old
age, a typical observation in high-income countries with low
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infant mortality rates. The poor and the displaced, however,
are the populations most affected by epidemics such as AIDS,
TB, epidemic typhus, or cholera, and the age distribution of
these populations is vastly different. Another simpliﬁcation
often used in the construction of deterministic models rests
on the assumption of homogeneous mixing of the population,
i.e. on the premise that all individuals in a certain population
associate randomly with each other. A recent mumps epidemic
in New York and New Jersey affected 3502 patients, 89% of
whom were fully immunized. The assumption of homogeneous
mixing of the population seems absurd, as 97% of cases
occurred in the orthodox Jewish population group; 78% of
them were male, and adolescents attending religious schools
were disproportionately affected [22]. More complex stochas-
tic models, which take variability and chance into account,
contain less epidemiologically improbable assumptions, but are
best applied to smaller populations, and require the inclusion
of more variables, greatly complicating their use.
Many policy-makers, journalists and doctors lack an
in-depth understanding of a model’s structure or limitations,
and may choose to accept or reject a certain prediction on the
basis of non-rational causality. The 2003 SARS epidemic
provides a good example. Early models suggested that isolation
of contacts before symptom onset would be beneﬁcial in
controlling the spread of the disease [23]. Contact tracing and
quarantine of asymptomatic people is, however, a daunting
task for any public health system, and only approximately 5% of
contacts who eventually became ill were in fact isolated before
becoming symptomatic [24]. An analysis of the real-life impact
of contact tracing and quarantine during the SARS crisis will, in
all likelihood, show that timely isolation of symptomatic
patients would have achieved nearly identical results, with
much greater efﬁciency. Quarantine of asymptomatic contacts
contributed little to SARS control, but probably led to excess
costs, increased psychological stress among those quarantined,
and a lingering misunderstanding of how the epidemic was
actually contained [24].
During the SARS epidemic, several estimates of the basic
reproduction number (i.e. R0, which is deﬁned as the average
number of people infected by one patient during an epidemic)
were published, and were generally in the range of 2–5 [24,25].
If an R0 of 2.6–3.2 had been used, one would have expected
30 000–10 000 000 SARS cases in China alone. Eventually,
only 782 cases were reported, suggesting a much lower R0
[26]. At the beginning of the SARS epidemic, during the course
of a ‘super-spreading event’, one person infected as many as
300 people [25]. Eventually, the reproduction number
dropped dramatically. Such a wide variation in R0 values
demonstrates how prone models are to errors when they use
limited data available during the initial phases of an outbreak,
based mostly on case reports. Why did SARS disappear? Was
it a huge success of international health regulations or a poorly
understood phenomenon? Retrospectively, we lack the under-
standing to model this epidemic’s course.
Doomsday predictions are more frequently discussed in the
popular media, and are probably also more likely to be
accepted for publication in scientiﬁc journals. The inadvertent
promotion of fear is likely to attract public funds, and will, in
retrospect, be applauded for any correct predictions, but
forgotten when found to be incorrect. In 1966, the economist
Paul A. Samuelson famously noted that “Wall Street indexes
predicted nine out of the last ﬁve recessions”. This observa-
tion is also relevant to yearly threats of a new pandemic, only a
minority of which actually materialize. In 2009, the French
emergency plan during the 2009 inﬂuenza pandemic was based
on an estimation of 91 000–210 000 deaths, and led to the
opening of 700 new hospital beds exclusively for inﬂuenza
patients in Marseille. In reality, <300 patients were hospital-
ized, and no more than 50 beds were used at the same time,
even at the pandemic’s peak [6].
When epidemiological predictions are made, the data used
are based on past observations, which may be irrelevant or
inaccurate. In 1990, the Journal of the American Medical
Association published an article describing the projected size
of the AIDS epidemic based on Farr’s law, which states that the
rise and fall of an epidemic curve is roughly symmetrical and
can be approximated by a normal bell-shaped curve [27].
William Farr, a British doctor and epidemiologist, based this
model on his observations of smallpox and cholera epidemics
in 19th-century London. The use of the same assumptions for
AIDS, a disease that is different in nearly every epidemiological
aspect, has led the authors to grossly underestimate AIDS
incidence in the USA [28]. Several epidemiologists have
noticed the ﬂawed use of Farr’s law, and a comment entitled
‘AIDS Projections: How Farr Out?’ was published in the same
journal soon after [29]. The ﬂawed prediction was, however,
repeatedly cited by other authors.
Models’ predictions usually have wide CIs, too wide to
direct public health interventions. The estimated reproduction
number (deﬁned as the average number of secondary cases
generated by a single infectious person) of the smallpox virus, a
potential bioterrorist weapon, was used in constructing a
model aimed at calculating the cumulative total number of
smallpox cases after deliberate exposure [30]. The authors
assumed that the transmission rate would be either 1.5 or 3.0
per person, that there would be an unlimited ‘supply’ of
smallpox-susceptible persons, that exactly ten persons would
initially be infected, and that no preventive intervention would
be implemented. When transmission rates of either 1.5 or 3.0
were used, the number of individuals presumed to
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become infected within 180 days ﬂuctuated between 2190 and
2.2 million. After 365 days, the predicted number of infections
was 224 000 vs. a theoretical 774 billion. These gargantuan
differences illustrate the inability of models to provide accurate
estimates a priori, even if several simplifying assumptions are
made. Active surveillance of smallpox cases and the use of
real-time data for model calibration will provide more reliable
estimates. In the meantime, models describing bioterrorist
smallpox attacks will yield doomsday scenarios for pessimists,
and ‘merely’ unpleasant public health nuisance scenarios for
optimists.
In conclusion, we argue that the interactions between
microorganisms and humans are far too complex to be
predictable. Most models used in epidemiological research still
concentrate on one, known, pathogen, which causes a single
disease in a well-deﬁned population. It seems, however, that
the reality at the microorganism level is much more complex,
as organisms not only mutate, but continuously interact with
the environment and with a large number of other organisms
[31,32]. Indicator-based surveillance methods and, more
recently, Internet biosurveillance systems can detect an
outbreak of an infection more rapidly than ever before.
Mathematical models play an important role in helping
healthcare systems to respond to ongoing epidemics or plan
the logistics of various theoretical scenarios, and were used in
Haiti during the cholera epidemic, with real-time surveillance
data [33]. Accurate predictions of epidemics before they occur
are, however, quite unlikely to become the norm. Forecasting
the course of epidemics is, to put it in Mark Twain’s words,
indeed “full of risks”.
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